Preface
As a city planning consultant during the s, I worked on many plans, policies, and studies, researching patterns of urban development and developing policies that aimed to shift these patterns to something more sustainable economically, environmentally, and socially. Research reports, official plans, city plans, regional plans, innovative zoning policies: as the documents produced began to take up an alarmingly high number of linear feet on my bookshelf, I became more frustrated by what I saw as a lack of progress on the ground. The plans produced, ostensibly governing development patterns, seemed to say all the right things. We should create compact, liveable, mixed-use, vibrant, and less auto-dependent communities. And yet, when I looked around in the suburbs, things seemed little changed. The Toronto region, where I live, was (and is) growing by about , people every year, equivalent to a small city. Forty thousand new homes are needed annually just to keep up with demand, not to mention retail, office, and industrial development. Hectare upon hectare of new suburbs were being built every year, casting the die and entrenching urban form for many, many years to come.
Yet, for the most part, these new suburbs seemed to be being built more or less as they always had been. True, the lots had often become narrower, somewhat increasing residential densities, though with negative consequences for the streetscape as the inevitable double garages now dominated even more than they had before. And there were a significant number of x Preface townhouses. But the suburban street patterns remained the same (arterial, collector, local, cul de sac), land uses were still fanatically separated, and the corner "convenience" plaza was the only place nearby to buy a litre of milk (more often than not still requiring a hop into the car). And these were some of the most progressive new suburbs in North America. Some suburban Toronto municipalities had been among the first to apply the principles of "new urbanism" when creating new communities, but ambitious plans were frequently scaled back. Each of these suburban municipalities had a planned urban centre, which was to be a focal point for the community, with civic uses and a denser, mixed-use, walkable core offering services and concentrated employment. Yet, these seemed to be precisely the places where development was not occurring.
In the core of the region, reurbanization was taking place. High-rise condominiums were being built, and former factories were being converted into residential lofts. New neighbourhoods emerged on former industrial lands. But outside of the core there was virtually no reurbanization taking place, even within communities that had relatively older urban areas. When I looked around in these other areas, I saw opportunity. I saw underutilized land in many forms: parking in front of the two-storey strip malls that lined Toronto's arterials, low-density development around subway stops or at major intersections, large expanses of surface parking at shopping centres or in industrial areas, and the suburban "town centres" that were less dense than the suburbs they served. It seemed to me that new growth offered an opportunity to vastly improve these areas; to diversify the activities, services, and shopping available; to improve the quality of the public realm; to better balance employment and residential uses; to put more transit riders within walking distance of stops and stations (or, better still, to allow residents to walk or cycle to work).
And there was no lack of pressure to do so, as the official plans recognized. The loss of valuable farmland and natural areas at the edge of the urban area, rising levels of traffic congestion, an increasing number of smogalert days every summer, and concern about greenhouse gas emissions and climate change were just a few of the pressing issues. I became concerned not only that we were building the equivalent of a small city every year at the urban fringe (and in a way that was of questionable sustainability) but also that, at the same time, we were building a massive future liability -an inefficient, inflexible urban form ill-suited to meeting future challenges, such as rising oil prices, financial market instability, or the productivity and competitiveness of businesses.
So, there were mounting pressures to change the development pattern, plentiful development opportunities existed, and the planning regime seemed to explicitly support more sustainable, compact urban forms. Why wasn't it happening? Of course, I was aware of the usual reasons given: zoning policies and engineering standards that still restricted compact development, planning approvals processes that were too arduous, NIMBYism, and banks that were loathe to take a gamble by financing "new" urban forms. Certainly these were factors. But I felt that something else had to be propelling these patterns. Early on, I had recognized that the structure of development charges was biased against reurbanization. I began to look further: in what ways, exactly, did this occur? I found that there were many. What about other financial instruments? Did they exert distorting pressures on development patterns? It became apparent to me that these and many other financial instruments, at all levels of government, represented adventures in mis-pricing that, from an urban development point of view, were critical to shaping development patterns. However, they consistently did so in a way that contradicted the planning objectives. While the city planners were busily envisioning a more compact, mixed-use urban form that would curb sprawl, and developing policies and regulations to secure it, down the hall the finance advisors were concocting financial instruments that would encourage and subsidize sprawl. The mis-pricing that these tools embodied was providing a powerful financial incentive to create more inefficient urban development. Not that they did this on purpose, but this was the unintended consequence of the financial instruments that they proffered. A situation was created in which planning and pricing policies were at loggerheads, with the latter actively undermining the former.
I came to recognize the critical importance of pricing to planning. I did so reluctantly as I was not keen to make myself into a student of pricing. I did not expect my planning career to bring me to the point where I am trying to decipher a pile of CRTC decisions written in tele-code in order to figure out how the hell local telephone rates are determined. But the role of pricing was, to me, incontrovertible. What is clear to me now is that, if the plans and policies aimed at creating more sustainable urban communities are to have any significant effect, it is fundamental that mis-pricing be addressed.
So, Perverse Cities is an attempt to explain why, after decades of planning, there seems to be so little tangible progress on the ground in curbing urban sprawl. It explores in some detail how mis-pricing acts to undermine planning policies aimed at creating more compact, mixed, sustainable communities. How can we identify instances of mis-pricing? How, exactly, do they operate to encourage sprawl? And how can we go about fixing these flaws in order to create accurate price signals and a level playing field? In short, how can planning do a better, more efficient and effective job of creating communities that meet the challenges of today and tomorrow?
Perverse Cities would not have been possible without the assistance of others, whom I would like to sincerely thank for their roles. Readers of drafts, including John van Nostrand and two anonymous peer reviewers, provided insightful comments and feedback that helped shape this book for the better. Michel Molgat Sereacki provided expert and enthusiastic research assistance. At UBC Press, Melissa Pitts was a thoughtful reviewer and patient guide through the publishing process, while Joanne Richardson's surgical copy editing smoothed out the many rough spots. Last and most, I thank Marvin, Oliver, and Audrey, who generously gave me the support, space, coffee, and considerable time needed to complete this project.
Of course, I remain far from being an expert on pricing, so any errors that may appear herein -on that score or on any other -are solely my responsibility.
1
Sprawl has been lamented for decades. It is usually discussed in terms of its costs, and there is a long list of these: more expensive road, sewer, and water networks; loss of farmland and natural open space; air pollution and related illnesses, such as childhood asthma; excessive commuting and obesity; car accidents; policing; inner-city decline; socioeconomic segregation; isolation of non-drivers; unattractive landscapes; and more. However costly sprawl has been in the past, the stakes are even higher today and into the future. This is because, first, the scale of sprawl itself is increasing; second, the impacts per unit of sprawl are also increasing; and third, the world is changing in a way that makes sprawl issues even more critical now than they have been in the past.
As in other countries, population growth in Canada is increasingly concentrated in cities and, especially, the largest urban regions. Nearly  percent of the nation's population growth between  and  occurred in metropolitan areas.
 Now almost half of Canada's population is concentrated in its six major urban regions.
 The vast majority of population and employment growth is taking place in outer suburbs, in the form of low-density, single-use suburbs on former farms or natural areas. The amount of land required for each person and job has been increasing. The Canadian urban population grew  percent between  and .
 The amount of urbanized land grew  percent during the same period, indicating that we are using more and more land per person.


The Price of Sprawl
Levels of car ownership are rising, along with distances driven per car. The number of motor vehicles in Canada has increased from about  million in  to almost  million in .
 In the Toronto area alone, it is projected that the number of vehicles will increase by almost  million, reaching . million by .
 Since  in Canada, urban automobile use has increased by  billion passenger-kilometres, reaching  billion passengerkilometres in , while transit travel has remained fairly steady, at  billion passenger-kilometres.
 And, even though fuel efficiency has improved, the move to larger vehicles and SUVs in recent decades, along with increases in truck traffic, has cancelled out these gains in efficiency. Emissions of most pollutants from motorized vehicles have continued to rise.
Moreover, some of the issues that are shaping up to play a major role in the twenty-first century are intimately related with sprawl. Water shortages are one example. Much urban growth is taking place in the very locations with the least water, such as the American sunbelt, while drought spreads across the agricultural centre of the continent. By disrupting natural hydrological cycles, sprawl contributes to drought. Access to a reliable, affordable water supply will become an ever more critical, city-shaping issue. Food security will be another. Maintaining productive farmland in close proximity to cities is fundamental to providing a secure, local food supply, while averting the substantial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with long-distance food transport.
Gas prices will continue to rise in the long term as cheaper oil sources become depleted. Rising gas prices intensify the strain on car-dependent neighbourhoods, households, and businesses. Many communities and business districts have been built in such a way that, other than by the automobile, there are very few means of access to and within them. Price peaks in  provided a taste of the potential impact of high gas prices, causing many to rethink their travel, housing, and business location choices. The short-term repercussions of high gas prices were already evident: the decline in the demand for larger vehicles and the closing of the auto plants that produced them. Persistent high prices will see the next phase of altered decision making: people and businesses looking to reduce their need to drive by seeking out urban environments that support walking, cycling, and transit. That is made much more difficult by the kind of urban environment we have built over the last fifty years or so.
Last but not least is the related issue of GHG emissions and global warming. Interestingly, some of the most sprawling nations are those that are either far from meeting their Kyoto commitments (Canada) or did not sign on to the Kyoto Accord to begin with (Australia and the United States). The excessive vehicle travel associated with urban sprawl is a key contributor to GHG emissions. Yet, many government "greening" policies and programs are not addressing the biggest causes of GHG emissions related to cities and urban development. Much of the attention has been focused on programs that aim to reduce consumption within the home -energy-efficient appliances, windows, insulation, furnaces, and so on.
However, when it comes to reducing energy use and GHG emissions, the location of the home is far more important than are the green features of the house itself. This is because urban location and local context (such as the presence of nearby shops and services, schools and employment opportunities, and the presence of walkable, connected streets) determine how much travel occurs and by what mode. Household-related transportation creates significantly more GHGs than does the running of the home itself. Of the GHGs emitted directly by Canadian households (i.e., in household travel, home heating, lighting, and running appliances), almost two-thirds is related to transportation. Moreover, while the absolute amount of GHG emissions related to running the home has remained relatively constant since , the emissions related to transportation have increased by about  percent.  It has also been shown that even the greenest house located in the suburbs, with all the latest energy-saving features and an energy-efficient car, consumes more total energy than does a conventional house with a conventional car located in an accessible urban area.  This is due to the continued need to drive long distances from the suburban home.
Another study found that simply changing the location of a household from outer suburb to inner area (while holding everything else constant) reduced GHG emissions related to travel by  percent.
 Altering the urban form alone and maintaining a suburban location reduced transportation emissions by  percent. But the household located in even the most compact mixed-use suburban neighbourhood still emitted more greenhouse gases than did one in the least compact inner-area neighbourhood. In other words, when it comes to reducing energy use and GHGs, location within the city and local context are critical determinants of GHGs and are substantially more important than are the features of the house. Yet, location and urban form are rarely addressed in GHG reduction strategies, where the focus has been squarely on introducing green features into the house itself.
For all of these reasons, it is increasingly necessary to refocus and redouble efforts to address urban sprawl (by directing growth to central and accessible locations) and to improve the local context of existing and new suburbs. This means retrofitting existing suburbs to diversify the mix of jobs and housing, improving the local accessibility of jobs and services, and increasing transit viability, walking, and cycling. It also means ensuring that newly built suburbs are mixed in terms of housing type and land uses, that they are compact, and that they are designed for modes of travel other than the automobile. Cities are expensive to build but slow and even more expensive to change. In an era of volatile energy costs, climate change, and water shortages, it is critical that new growth take a different tack. Otherwise, we continue to embed severe future problems by building sprawl that will be very difficult and expensive to mitigate.
Unfortunately, to this point, the record on dealing with sprawl is not particularly encouraging. For decades now, planners and others have been trying to put an end to urban sprawl. From the ecosystem planning of the s to sustainable development in the s and, most recently, "smart growth, " governments have devoted considerable resources to altering the way in which cities grow. Had these approaches been successful, we ought by now to be living in the kinds of cities described in planning documents -that is, cities that are "healthy, " "sustainable, " "liveable, " "compact, " "transit-oriented, " "walkable, " "mixed use, " and "efficient. " Clearly, this is not the case.
In other words, planning is not curbing urban sprawl. Urban development continues along the same trajectory as it did before plans for more sustainable and compact development were adopted. Despite the spread of planning across communities, and its increased depth and focus on sustainable urban development patterns, it is not delivering results. Even some of the loudly trumpeted new approaches to city growth, such as new urbanism, have been criticized as merely producing "cuter sprawl. "
The Sprawl Debate
Over recent decades, a substantial literature has accumulated on the issue of urban sprawl, focusing on its costs, its causes, and its remedies. It can be roughly divided into two camps: the first camp views sprawl as undesirable, while the second views it as benign and natural.
The first camp, which holds the prevailing view of sprawl, contends that it comes with many costs -social, economic, and environmental. Adherents of this view include planners, urban designers, and environmentalists.

Various movements, such as smart growth, new urbanism, and sustainable development fall within this camp, which sees sprawl as a problem because it comes with high social and private costs. Most often cited are the direct costs of a low-density development pattern at the urban edge, such as the loss of farmland and natural areas in proximity to the city. Other costs are attributed to the automobile dependency that is inherent in the low-density, single-use development pattern that characterizes sprawl. This includes driving costs, congestion, air pollution, climate change, health costs, accidents, policing, and road infrastructure as well as social costs incurred by those who are excluded because they cannot drive or cannot afford a vehicle, and by those who suffer lengthy daily commutes. The costs of other infrastructure, such as sewer, water, and utilities, are also raised on a per-dwelling-unit basis when density is low. According to the first camp, the current North American sprawl story began in the post-Second World War period, when it was supported by subsidies (such as federal housing programs for returning veterans and massive investments in highways) and then entrenched in an array of planning regulations and engineering standards.
Those in the first camp hold that the high costs associated with sprawl warrant a substantial intervention in order to turn these patterns around, creating instead more integrated, mixed-use, dense, and walkable neighbourhoods and districts. This can be achieved through better design and alternative forms of regulation, along with more strategic investment in infrastructure. This might include, for example, following the principles of "traditional neighbourhood development" put forward by the new urbanists, alternative engineering standards and forms of regulation, and more regional governance.
The second camp -which holds the minority view and comprises a relatively small group -takes a different approach to the issue of sprawl,  noting, among other things, that it was in evidence long before the Second World War.
 This camp sees more recent urban development patterns as the result of economic and technological trends, expressed through a property market working to respond to consumer demand. In particular, the decentralization and suburbanization of recent decades is driven by rising real incomes and falling transportation costs, which have allowed homes and businesses to locate farther from central cities, typically consuming more land and floorspace per capita relative to central locations. In this view, sprawl is the natural and largely benign result of rising standards of living. If anything, the quality of people's lives has been improved with these advancements. According to this camp, what consumers demand is sprawl, which is what the market provides, and there is very little wrong with that. Holcombe and Staley sum up this view as follows:
Development patterns at the beginning of the twenty-first century are the result of market forces that respond to the demands of citizens, as residents, as workers and as consumers. If one understands the role that market forces have played in generating sprawling development patterns, several things become more obvious. First, it becomes apparent that regardless of the merits of altering current trends, it will be difficult for public policy to do so, because market forces will work in the opposite direction. Second, it is clear that there will be unintended secondary effects from antisprawl policies that may make people worse off. Third, these development patterns, responding to public demand, may not be so undesirable after all. And fourth, the way in which to design and implement land-use policy to further commonly held goals becomes clearer.

Holcombe and Staley's fourth point gets us into the remedies proposed. Not surprisingly, this camp holds that few measures are needed, other than continuing to rely on the market, as the status quo is considered to be just about right. As an alternative to the smart growth strategies proposed by the first camp, the second camp recommends a laissez-faire approach, which is "guided by market forces, and foresees lower population densities and automobile travel as inevitable characteristics of the twenty-first century, and attempts to accommodate those market forces rather than to counteract them. "  In practice, this means spending less on transit (where investment has inhibited road construction) and more on roads, which, by drawing traffic from existing roads, should reduce overall congestion. These roads should be paid for with user charges. Once the road building has been completed, then governments should retreat from land-use policy because the market will ensure the efficient use of land and minimize incompatible uses: "One might argue that this restriction in private property rights is justified to further the common good, but when one recognizes that the changes smart growth is trying to reverse are the result of market forces and personal choice, the arguments in favour of policies that fly in the face of these preferences lose their force. "

The Price of Sprawl
As I show in more detail in subsequent chapters, the evidence is overwhelming that sprawl incurs significant private and social costs across North American cities. One can't ignore these costs as do the sprawl advocates: they are real. But they have a good point when they assert that attempts to stop sprawl haven't worked at any meaningful scale;  however, they are wrong about the reasons why this is true. Both the anti-and the pro-sprawl groups have failed to recognize a critical set of sprawl drivers -drivers that are the key to actually curbing sprawl. The focus of the debate has been on the cost of sprawl rather than on its price -that is, on what sprawl costs rather than on the price we actually pay for it. Another way of looking at the issue is as follows. Sprawl is the result of a few key decisions that are made millions and millions of times every day across our cities by families, consumers, employees, businesses, developers, institutions, and governments. Together, these interdependent decisions relating to the use of land and travel ultimately determine how cities grow. Where to buy or rent a house -centre, inner suburb, new suburb, exurb? How big? What size of lot? What kind of neighbourhood -walkable and mixed use or car-oriented? How to get to work and do errands -bike, walk, transit, car? Where to locate my business? How much land? How much building? How will I and my employees get to work and conduct business travel? How will customers and suppliers get here? Will there be on-site parking?
These decisions are played out literally millions of times as cities grow and change. In recent years, about , homes are sold in Canada annually, and , new houses start construction.  In the United States, about  million people move house each year (of a total population of  million).
 Every day, millions of people decide how and where to travel. Ultimately, these four key intertwined decisions -regarding location, how much land, how much building, and mode of travel -are what shape urban development patterns. They are governed by many factors, such as proximity to family, work, employees, or suppliers as well as space needs. An important part of each of these decisions, however, is price. How much will a house cost depending on whether it is on a larger or smaller lot, on whether it is a larger or smaller house? How does the price of an inner-city location compare with that of a suburban property? These questions are critical components of the decision-making process.
Price is intended to give an accurate signal of the actual costs associated with the decision. This is a basic economic principle and one that, in economists' terms, ensures the efficient allocation of resources. In other words, an accurate price signal ensures that neither overspending on resources nor under-allocation of resources occurs. If prices are lower than costs, then consumers will consume too much of a good or service. Conversely, if the price is too high, too little of it will be consumed when compared to what is optimal and efficient.
With regard to development, when we talk about prices that accurately reflect costs, what is meant is that the actual costs associated with different locations and local contexts, different sizes of buildings and lots, and different modes and amounts of travel are accurately reflected in the prices charged for them. Only when accurate prices are charged -prices that reflect these cost variations -can efficient urban development patterns be achieved.
This applies not only to the prices of the property itself (i.e., the purchase price of a home or business property) but also to the prices of all of the other components that are considered when making a property decision. Given that location and transportation decisions tend to be made in tandem, transportation prices are very important, including vehicle costs, automobile insurance, gas, parking, and/or transit passes. Other costs considered include mortgage servicing, property taxes covering roads and other municipal services, natural gas (for heating), electricity, phone, and cable and internet access. In Perverse Cities, the phrase "urban goods and services" is used to refer collectively to this package of elements (including land, buildings, transportation, and services), which forms part of propertyrelated decisions.
Unfortunately, with respect to the key decisions described above, the prices charged for the property and related services rarely if ever reflect their actual costs. Moreover, they act precisely in a manner that encourages the overconsumption of land, building, and transportation and discourages the efficient use of these resources. Inefficient development (such as lowdensity development or development that is distant from service networks) is priced at a discount, while efficient development (such as smaller lots or accessible locations) suffers from inflated prices. In other words, prices currently provide incentives to sprawl and disincentives to efficient development. And, to add insult to injury, it is usually the efficient development that is directly subsidizing the inefficient development. In other words, the owner of the Smart car is subsidizing the Hummer owner.
Why is it that prices charged rarely reflect actual costs and how do these cross-subsidies occur? As I show in Perverse Cities, a few common pricing and policy flaws are repeated over and over. One very common flaw is that prices are based on average costs, rather than on marginal costs as recommended by economists. This occurs when costs vary with location, density, context, or type of land use but prices do not. For example, in the case of network infrastructure and services such as water, sewer, or roads, extensive research has shown that lower densities mean higher infrastructure costs per unit.
 But prices charged for these services rarely reflect the higher costs of servicing a larger or more distant lot; rather, prices based on average costs are used. In other words, costs are averaged across a range of different types of development associated with a range of actual costs. This leads inevitably to a situation in which those properties that incur lower-thanaverage costs pay more than their costs, while those properties that incur higher-than-average costs pay less than their costs. Thus, by definition, this form of mis-pricing leads to cross-subsidies.
Whether these distortions are evident in the price of services such as water or internet connectivity, or whether they become embedded in the price of the property itself (as they usually do in the case of development charges),  they create a set of "perverse subsidies" that provide financial incentives for inefficient development and disincentives for efficient development (see box) . While subsidies are provided by the government to support a positive outcome that might not otherwise occur, perverse subsidies inflict negative, unintended consequences.
The difference between a twenty-foot-wide lot and a sixty-foot-wide lot may seem insignificant, and, if we were talking about one house or even a few, it might indeed be.
 However, when the difference is multiplied, say, , times -which is a conservative estimate of the number of new single detached houses that will be needed in the Toronto area alone over the next thirty years  -it is easy to see the magnitude of the aggregate impacts. This includes more urbanized farmland and natural areas, more kilometres of roads, water and sewer pipes, gas pipes, and cables and conduits than would otherwise be needed as well as more auto travel and higher infrastructure costs.
In addition to prices based on average costs and the cross-subsidies they inevitably entail, there are yet other kinds of perverse subsidies and mis-prices that occur -when prices are completely unrelated to costs precipitated, for example, or in the cases of direct subsidies or "bundled" goods and services. There are also poorly designed policies and programs that create market biases and mis-incentives. Many examples of each of these kinds of market distortion are detailed in subsequent chapters. Together, these perverse prices, flawed policies, and market distortions undermine efforts to curb urban sprawl. A market that operates in this manner is the opposite of what planning calls for. Planning in its many guisessmart growth, new urbanism, sustainable development -has set about to achieve compact, mixed-use cities with efficient development and to curb urban sprawl. However, it has had very little success in doing so. And is this any wonder, when the very kinds of land use that it is trying to curb are subsidized and offered at discount prices, while the kinds it is trying to encourage are overpriced?
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Planning has adopted a regulatory approach that has been blind to market flaws. The regulatory and design-oriented frameworks are fighting an uphill battle that is in direct opposition to powerful market forces and price signals that encourage sprawl. Indeed, many regulatory policies, such as zoning, that mandate minimum densities or separation of land uses are themselves often a source of sprawl.

Sprawl advocates are right when they say that planners would do well to pay closer attention to market realities and dynamics. Now, with new pressures and realities, the case for pricing sprawl is more relevant than ever. However, their prescription to simply rely on the market in its current form is misguided. While planners may ignore the market, sprawl promoters ignore the fact that it is highly distorted in sprawl's favour. An unfettered market with accurate price signals would curb sprawl, not create it. The evidence and analysis I present address the sprawl proponents' view that natural market forces are at work and show why their view is fundamentally flawed.
Perverse Cities attempts to explain why planning efforts to curb sprawl, so intense and so long-lived, have delivered only weak results at best. In trying to find out why this is so, one is drawn out of the conventional realm of planning and into the realm of economics and fiscal policy, where one discovers that powerful levers are working in a manner that directly undermines the objectives of planning, smart growth, and the curtailment of sprawl. I attempt to uncover these largely hidden and undiscovered economic, fiscal, and financial drivers; to explain exactly how they undermine efforts to stop sprawl; and to lay out a course that, at least, corrects them and, at best, makes them over into strong drivers of efficient urban development patterns.
It is important to note up front that the type of market failure that is most often discussed with respect to sprawl -namely, the lack of pricing of externalities such as air pollution or loss of open space -is not my focus; rather, I address the pricing of the urban goods and services that comprise development decisions to which prices of some form are already attached, and that are currently paid for in the market -but are typically poorly priced. As such, my focus is on the direct costs related to urban development -of land, buildings, infrastructure, and related services -not external costs (such as air pollution) that, at present, are mostly unpriced. While the pricing of externalities is a valuable tool in the planner's repertoire, and can play an important role in curbing sprawl, a fairly extensive literature on this exists already. I leave it to others to continue to pursue this tack.
For my part, I detail the pricing and policy mis-incentives that are rarely discussed, especially in the planning literature. Addressing these flaws will, in and of itself, go a long way towards curbing sprawl. In fact, it is necessary to do this if one wants to have any significant success in curbing sprawl. At present, there is no economic imperative to build more efficiently; the right price signals are needed. It should be made clear, however, that dealing with these flaws alone will not be sufficient to curb sprawl. Other measures, such as good urban design, will be needed. Regulation still plays a role, but some strategic deregulation may also be necessary (such as removing or reforming planning policies that add to sprawl). But smart pricing must play a key role in achieving smart growth objectives.
In illustrating the arguments presented in Perverse Cities, and in explaining potential tools, I take many examples from the Toronto region, the Province of Ontario, and Canada as these are the areas with which I am most familiar. In many cases, research, data, and analyses pertaining to the topic of market distortions and their effect on urban development patterns are scarce. And when, as was often the case, suitable examples or case studies could not be found more locally, I ventured further afield -to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australasia. The one proviso is that the context and its analysis had to be relevant and applicable to the North American and other market economies experiencing sprawl. Whatever the source of the example, the applicability of the analysis and the solutions is widespread. This is because sprawl is widespread, a serious and growing concern.
Perverse Cities is organized as follows. Part  explores how sprawl has been typically defined as a planning problem that has planning solutions (Chapters  and ). Part  indicates the specific problems inherent in this approach, i.e., that the costs and benefits of planning are rarely sufficiently considered (Chapter ), that planning approaches have not been particularly successful in their attempts to curb sprawl (Chapter ), and that planning approaches have underemphasized the economic context in which cities
